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(1) Introduction
The so-called Arrow-Debreu model, until today, represents a trademark of rigorous economic research -be it as a benchmark for extending the model, for weakening its assumptions, for structuring data-sets, or for providing alternative models. Moreover, it is part of the initiation of economists at graduate school, as well as a cornerstone of economists" policy-related activities. Regarding economists" historical consciousness, Arrow-Debreu marks a lower limit: referring to work before Arrow-Debreu tends to be seen as historical rumination, while reference to work after Arrow-Debreu potentially counts as a contribution to economic theory. And so it seems appropriate that Arrow and Debreu"s article of 1954 is the only piece of work in economics that was worth two Nobel prizes, one for Arrow in 1972, and another for Debreu in 1983. But who earns credit? Arrow, Debreu, both 1 In addition, Debreu kept a personal chronology of his scientific career documenting the order of events of conceiving the proof (DP additional carton 3).
In order to set the stage, I describe the different paths by which Arrow and
Debreu arrived at the point of recognizing the opportunity of a joint article (2). In a largely informal fashion, I go through the issues they had to resolve, their negotiations of what to include and exclude, and the compromises they made before agreeing on a final version (3). I then contrast the research their joint work triggered vis-à-vis the increasing popularity of the Arrow-Debreu model in the profession at large (4).
(2) Simultaneous Discovery?
Arrow and Debreu, both born in 1921, were in their early 30s when they joined forces.
As people, this was the only fact they had in common. If one reverses their intelligence, one could compare them with Laurel and Hardy. Arrow was extroverted, outspoken, quick, highly eclectic, and unafraid of dropping a brick; Debreu was introverted, silent, shy, dogmatic, and afraid of making a mistake. While Arrow thought on his feet and immediately said what came to his mind, Debreu could not walk without a safety-net (as Hildenbrand used to tell him) and never spoke up before knowing the definite answer.
As a PhD student of Arrow and long-time colleague of Debreu at Berkeley said about them communicating:
I have visions of conversations consisting of Arrow going on at an extremely rapid pace, and Gerard every once in a while saying something, or coming back with a proof.
I can"t imagine a dialogue between the two of them. Their styles were just so different. In 1972, at the AEA lunch in honor of Arrow"s Nobel Prize, Debreu gave a toast. He noted "the breadth of your interests and your extraordinary willingness to discuss economic ideas at any stage of their developments." (DPC 14) In both respects, Debreu could not be more different than Arrow. This difference would not be noteworthy if it had not reflected their role in the process of writing. To begin with, what were the different ways that led Arrow and Debreu to their "discovery" of a topological existence proof in general equilibrium theory (GET)?
When considering the origin of Arrow"s and Debreu"s interest in an existence proof, we need some sense of its time. During the early post-war years, the interaction between mathematics and economic theory was continuously re-negotiated on various and unstable political grounds. It is most intricate to disentangle interests in economic theory, excitement about new mathematical tools, obligations towards political positions, and the influence of the military funding scene. As wide as these ramifications of innovations in mathematical economics are, however, so tight was the community in which it took place. Those who pushed mathematical economics beyond calculus (which was the mathematics previously known among economists) were almost exclusively centered at the Cowles Commission in Chicago. There, several research programs (Keynesian and Walrasian, statistical and theoretical, applied and pure) were pursued next to each other with great enthusiasm about techniques and little pondering about their impact on the profession at large. Hardly anyone at Cowles in the post-war years had expected that their group would once move from the periphery into the centre of economic research. "How small that group looks in retrospect," Debreu later exclaimed when praising Arrow, "and how difficult it would have been to anticipate that several of your contributions would become standard parts of the graduate economic theory program." (DPC 14)
The starting point for the new era of mathematical economics onto which Arrow Debreu moved in the same circles, they had not met each other.
Debreu had a rather different background than Arrow. In his Nobel lecture, he would say:
Kenneth Arrow has told in his Nobel lecture about the path that he followed to the point where it joined mine. The route that led me to our collaboration was somewhat different. After having been influenced at the École Normale Supérieur in the early forties by the axiomatic approach of N. Bourbaki (…) (Debreu 1984: 88) Henri Cartan, one of the founding members of the Bourbaki group and Debreu"s they were missing, first, a conception of the existence problem, and, second, the key insight that an equilibrium could be formalized as a fixed-point. A handful of articles were crucial for both elements: von Neumann (1936) , Kakutani (1941) , Wald (1951 Wald ( [1936 ), and Nash (1951 1953 [1944]: 15) . And yet the two theorems were "oddly connected," von Neumann wrote, for being reducible to one another via a saddle point (1945 [1936] : 1).
Von Neumann and Morgenstern wondered whether "there may be some deeper formal connections here (…). The subject should be clarified further." (1953 [1944] : 154)
Without anyone ever clarifying further, the equivalence made possible the steady crowding out of game theory as an alternative "paradigm" to competition. Kakutani (1941) Somehow, when reading Hicks, I got the idea that there was a question whether these solutions exist. I guess I had been exposed to enough mathematics to know that when one has a system of equations one worries about existence. (in Feiwel 1987: 194) After the war, he learned of Abraham Wald"s work on existence and read it in German before being translated in 1951. He talked to Wald, but was discouraged:
I do remember asking him about them and about possible generalizations (particularly with regard to the production assumptions). He felt the field was very difficult and did not encourage further work (…) I did not believe I was the one capable of really improving on the results. (in Weintraub 1985: 96) Arrow accepted Wald as a mathematical authority. But then, "after reading first von Neumann", he says, "but especially Nash"s 1950 paper," (in Feiwel 1987 Debreu, instead, was not struck by Nash, let alone Wald. Being trained in the axiomatic method of Bourbaki, Debreu was less interested in the contexts of utilizing fixed point theorems, but rather in the fact that it was a topological theorem -topology being one of the "mother-structures" of Bourbakian mathematics. His first encounter of the fixed-point theorem could have been von Neumann and Morgenstern referring to Kakutani (1944: 154) . But more encouraging must have been his first office mate at Cowles, Morton Slater, who used Kakutani"s theorem, too (1950) . And von Neumann"s article?
The paper by Wald that gave the first proof of existence in the early 1930s did not happen to be important for me. The work of von Neumann on growth turned out to be much more significant since, in particular, it led to Kakutani"s theorem (in Feiwel 1987: 249).
Von Neumann"s 1936 article, as mentioned above, was the only time von Neumann used a general equilibrium framework. But it was not even that which caught Debreu"s interest. He approved of it since it led to Kakutani"s generalization without any economic context. Besides approval, Debreu was proud having found, if not an error, but a mathematical slip: von Neumann"s theorem was unnecessarily restrictive for his purpose. "He did not need that powerful tool to prove the theorem that he was after. The separation theorem for convex sets was quite sufficient." (Debreu, in Leonard 1992: 3) Though this discovery must have been very satisfying for Debreu, he later would comment reverently: "Thus the main mathematical tool for the proof of existence of a GE owes its origin to an accident." (1998: 3)
Debreu thus never conceived of von Neumann"s aversion against standard price theory. For the same reason he was not taken aback by reading Nash:
It was important, in a way, via Kakutani"s Theorem, the fixed point theorem, which has always remained one of the major mathematical tools, in my opinion. But [the] Nash equilibrium has never played an important role for me professionally (Debreu, in Leonard 1992: 9) And so Debreu expected his contribution to economics would be to work with a yet more general version of the fixed point theorem as advanced by topologists of the day. All in all, though Arrow and Debreu arrived at the proof by different paths, much ground had already been covered before they began their joint work. Arrow suggested speaking of a "simultaneous discovery": "This was essentially an example of two people arriving totally independently at the same solution" (in Feiwel 1987: 195) .
This "discovery" was certainly in the air since von Neumann"s pioneering article, but what is important for the present purpose is that, after they had conceived the idea of a fixed-point proof in GET independently, the making of Arrow and Debreu would only require negotiations on the surface without confronting their notions of its deeper meaning. Dear Dr. Arrow: Koopmans last week handed me your remarkable paper "On the existence of Solutions…perfect competition." I have read it thoroughly with great delight and now I take the liberty of sending you a long letter of comments. I hope that the criticism I will occasionally make will not mean, in your eyes, that my admiration for the way in which you overcame the difficulties of this subject is lessened.
I had been working myself intensively on this problem for some time when your paper reached me but I had not yet obtained a complete proof of the existence of equilibrium.
After having read your article I easily bridged the last gaps in my work. I will give you, below, a concise account of my line of approach, a little different from yours.
In his comments, Debreu provided meticulous hints of how to simplify the proof (as e.g.
by describing technological possibilities not by a convex set, but by convex cones) or how to renounce assumptions (most important convexity by contractibility). More critically, he noted an actual error regarding the discontinuity of the minimum worth condition when prices are zero. But the major criticism Debreu addressed in this first letter was that he did not approve of Arrow"s use of the "fictitious player":
The introduction of the fictitious players I + 1 j 2I with the use of Kuhn and Tucker"s theorem seems artificial to me (and this is probably my most important criticism). The approach I have taken below gets around this.
By using the fictitious player, as noted above, Arrow wanted to remain true to Nash"s game theoretical context from which he conceived the existence proof. Debreu, to anticipate the result, would not succeed in convincing Arrow. The fictitious player would be mentioned in the article, but omitted in Debreu"s Theory of Value. It would Debreu, instead, completed , a joint paper with the mathematician Israel Herstein on "Nonnegative Square Matrices" in February 1952 ; he also worked on the "real representation of a preference ordering", completed as a working paper in April 1952 April (1954 .
remain a sore point regarding the interpretation of the article. The fictitious player not only could be associated with the Walrasian auctioneer (a notion that has put forth the question how one reaches an equilibrium), but would be reason enough notably for game theorists to interpret Arrow-Debreu as most suitable for a socialist economy (Shubik 1977 (Shubik [1972 ). Clearly, Debreu had never felt the urge to respond to interpretations such as Shubik"s.
A week later, on February 12, Debreu sent a short note, clarifying Arrow"s error and added: "I will finally write a discussion paper about this question and send it to you as soon as it is ready." This paper was the discussion paper 2032: "an economic equilibrium existence theorem" (1952a Having admitted the error, Arrow also noted a similar mistake in Debreu"s paper regarding corner solutions: initial endowments (in their notation, z o hi ) need to be strictly positive (1952a: 7, line 10). Debreu immediately added an Erratum on March 14.
Arrow, however, vilified Debreu"s mistake for its trivial economic meaning:
The defect is very trivial from an economic point of view, since assuming the existence of labor variables amounts to saying no more than that an individual will work if he has no other source of income.
Arrow continued by suggesting a new version of his theorem (his "Lemma 2") without accepting Debreu"s more general version of the proof, and added:
The Theorem just stated is provable in exactly the same way as my Lemma 2. It is, of course, a special case of your theorem, though it has the advantage of avoiding direct hypothesis [?] the continuity of A i (ā i ), which may be difficult to verify in given situations.
This remark is telling for Arrow"s attitude. He insisted on his own less general Lemma for the sake of it economic meaning, and, at this point, even its greater verifiability! Arrow aimed at making the model "work." Assumptions too strong would amount to a failure. Debreu hardly thought that way: which assumptions are necessary is mathematically determined, while their meaning is to be assessed ex-post. If they are weak -good for the economist! If they are strong, the proof is valuable for showing the restrictiveness of the model. Proving existence does not make a model work, but assesses the model. "In proving existence," he would say later, "one is not trying to make a statement about the real world, one is trying to evaluate the model." (in Feiwel 1987: 243) Having found an error, and demanding his own version of the theorem, Arrow suggested joining forces:
In view of the essential overlapping of results between the two of us, I would propose that we prepare a joint publication. The relation between the two approaches needs some clarification (…) There should be a still more general function covering both cases, but it may not be worthwhile to investigate. Of course, if you prefer separate publication, it will be perfectly acceptable to me.
Debreu must have felt little surprised, since the difference between his approach (via Begle) and Arrows (via Nash) apparently seemed rather insignificant to Arrow. He also must have felt honored for Arrow had already established a name in the Cowles community. Since everyone in his surrounding had greater experience in economic reasoning than himself, he was advised to seize the opportunity to upgrade his economic I suggest that in our economic paper we state the preliminary mathematical results with convexity only, that we define naturally all the necessary concepts, but that we give no proof. There will be so much to prove anyhow, and it is certainly highly advisable to keep the mathematical details at their minimum. Are you in general favorable to this?
Although this suggestion would set Debreu in the most passive role in the further process of writing -serving as no more than the mathematical proof-reader -it was consequential from his point of view: if generality does not count at all and if economic meaning is everything that counts, why bother with a proof at all? But Debreu would not convince Arrow. In the end, the proof would be included. One may wonder if literary economics would still be an option today if Arrow had accepted Debreu"s proposal.
So far for the first round of negotiations. Debreu planned to write a first draft by May, and, at that point, expected that it could be presented at the September meeting of the Econometric Society in East Lansing. But their work was interrupted. Arrow was busy in Europe, and Debreu suffered from a kidney infection that lasted over a month before further suffering from the summer heat, as he apologized for the lack of work on July 14. After he received the green light from Arrow, Debreu preferred to first conclude the synthesis of his two discussion papers (1951b, 1952a) as it would appear by August: "A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem" (1952b). This paper is notable in that it presents the equilibrium without referring to competitive or strategic behavior at all. Debreu simply spoke, more generally, of interdependence of behavior. In his conclusion, he made clear what his target discourse was when dealing with economics: he praised Begle"s, Montgomery"s, and Eilenberg"s generalizations of the fixed-point theorem "as valuable contributions to topology whose origin can be traced directly to economics." (1952b: 892) While for Arrow, mathematics was useful for economics, for Debreu, economics was useful for mathematics.
Second phase (December 1952 to May 1953)
Robert Strotz, the editor of Econometrica, had heard of Arrow"s and Debreu"s project from Koopmans and invited them to present their work at the December meeting of the Econometric Society in Chicago. They accepted and had to agree on a presentable draft.
Shortly after Arrow"s return from Europe, on Wednesday, December 10, 1952, they finally met at Stanford for their first time in person. After understanding with whom they had gotten involved, they must have grasped that they were working on different intellectual projects. Indeed, they had not much to debate, as Arrow suggested: "It was a wonderful experience, he was just so brilliant to work with. One of us would say a single word, and the other would just understand immediately." (in Gallagher We should make a great effort to make clear the logical structure of the theorems and carefully distinguish assumptions (underlined) and conditions (underlined). It is probably impossible to succeed completely without excessive pedantry.
In later accounts, Debreu would present this "careful distinction" as the main contribution of their paper (1984) . The fact that he, still at this late stage of the process, had to caution Arrow in separating these two contexts shows how little Arrow obeyed this imperative. Arrow began the letter by apologizing that he was unnecessarily copious due to relating their "abstract ideas to the raw material of economic reality": Some of my comments on the assumptions were fairly detailed, but I think they are useful in relating the abstract ideas to the raw material of economic reality. I have probably been pedantic in spelling out details of the proof, instead of leaving them to the reader, please make any changes along those lines that you care to. My work was tremendously simplified by the excellent set of notes that you supplied me with, and I want to thank you for them. (…) I have generalized the formulation of dividends to permit non-proportional payments. This in no way complicates the proof, and it adds to the realism, since we can treat of preferred stock, bonds, and other forms of corporate financing.
Another change for "adding to the realism" was to use "excess demand" instead of "net demand" for the sake of relating their work to the law of supply and demand:
The most important deviation is my unrepentant feeling that "excess demand" is a better concept than "net demand". It simplifies expressions any number of times and is basic when dealing with the interpretation of market equilibrium in terms of the law of supply and demand. Why don"t you take a little poll among the Cowles Commission people?
Arrow seemingly assumed that their work was a formalization of "the law of supply and demand". There is no reason to believe that Debreu had ever considered this interpretation at all. In regard to Vickrey"s objection that the initial holding may not be sufficient for survival, I have run across an interesting passage in Joan Robinson"s "pure theory of international trade" in her collected Economic Papers. In reference to the theory of equilibrium in that field she holds that it may very well not be possible at the existing levels of population. That is, the equilibrating process may operate through the death of part of the population. "The invisible hand works, but it may work by strangulation".
It was such remarks that Debreu had referred to as "forced interpretations."
As it is with negotiations, actual differences are brought forward only at the end.
Note that until this point, the paper was not discursively embedded by any means. At no point of their work so far, had they discussed their views on the context of the proof. On April, 13, 1953, Arrow sent Debreu his version of the introduction including the "historical note" (1954, section 6) . "If you want to, expand the introduction in any way.
I am not too satisfied with it as it stands, but I just ran out of ideas." The article came close to conclusion without Arrow and Debreu ever discussing any of the issues Arrow raised in this introduction and historical remark -that is, above all, the proof"s usefulness for "both descriptive and normative economics" (265), the tradition going back to Walras, Cassel, Neisser, Stackelberg, Zeuthen, etc., and the relationship between existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium (287 ff.).
In his reply (April 23), Debreu showed that he had not considered the necessity of an introduction before: "I think that a short introduction was quite in order. Similarly, concerning welfare economics, Arrow insisted twice on reference to standard articles like those of Lange (1942) or Hotelling (1938) , but Debreu insisted twice on leaving them out and won out over Arrow (see letters April 17, May 4, May 13). Thus, only at their very end, there were some signs of disagreement regarding the economic meaning of their proof, particularly as concerns welfare economics.
In the last revisions that Debreu sent some days before submission, on May 13, 1953, he again pushed off the mathematics that he would want to claim for himself. Needless to say that this does not imply any feeling that we should regard this as an over-specialized study. It is addressed to a classical problem in economic theory and bring to it new mathematical tools.
Referring to "a classical problem" and "new mathematical tools" in one breath, this was the first time that out of Arrow and Debreu arose Arrow-Debreu.
(4) The Becoming of Arrow-Debreu
For Cowlesmen there could not have been any doubts about the worth of Arrow and Debreu"s joint article. But outside Cowles, there were not many economists able to appreciate the mathematics, and not many mathematicians able to appreciate the economics. This predicament led to an actual conflict during the refereeing process, as has been thoroughly described by Weintraub and Gayer (2001) . Nicholas GeorgescuRoegen, the Associate Editor of Econometrica, sent the paper to William Baumol and an outsider mathematician, Cecil Phipps, who emphatically argued against publication.
The negotiations between the Cowles community and Econometrica undermined Phipps voice and thus an actual alternative approach in mathematical economics. But these quarrels were not taken to the authors themselves. Arrow and Debreu had not to defend their paper against outsiders, and they hardly accepted any changes from the refereeing process.
3 Regarding our present purpose of showing their difference, more revealing are the different impulses their joint work set for each of them. According to our account, it comes as no surprise that they headed in different directions. Hall), and to Andre Weil and to P. Samuel (at a lunch at the Weils) in the spring 1955.
In both cases, my purpose was to discuss the question whether one could dispense with a fixed point theorem in proving the lemma (DP, additional carton 4). And so, right after publication, Arrow joined forces with Alain Enthoven (1956), Leonid Hurwicz (1958) , and Henry Block (Arrow, Hurwicz, Block 1959) in order to prove stability. This research on stability circled around the difference between local and global stability, introduced the Lyapounov theorem, set in spot the so-called weak axiom of revealed preferences and the strong assumption of gross-substitutability, and ultimately ended in a dead end of systematic counter-examples. In a row of replies to
Arrow"s stabilizing attempts, counter-example after counter-example frustrated the belief in a rigorous proof of market forces (Scarf 1960 , McKenzie 1960 , Gale 1963 Debreu, as mentioned, had never even posed that question of stability. About
Hurwicz and Arrow"s work he merely "shook his head. He knew at the outset that this leads to nowhere." (WH) For Debreu, as mentioned, equilibrium was a matter of the consistency of a model, and not a state of the world: "when you are out of equilibrium,"
he later explains, "you cannot assume that every commodity has a unique price because that is already an equilibrium determination" (in Weintraub 2002: 146) . Disequilibrium, for Debreu, is a contradiction in itself, since then prices have no conceivable identity whatsoever.
Next to his work on stability in direct response to his work with Debreu, Arrow did not cease to increase, though, to be sure, references in Econometrica decrease. Even if we consider the references per capita -given the substantial growth of the profession 6 Based on data from SCCI and Google scholar. For similar results, see Oehler 1990. 7 Notably, during this decade, there already was a reference by an historian of economics (Jaffe 1967) .
While de-homogenizing Menger, Jevons, and Walras, he contributed to the homogenization of Arrow and Debreu. Historians were quick, quicker than the great share of the profession of economics in stating the historical importance of the article. Considering the increasing popularity to reconstruct the history of GET among historians during the 1970s and 1980s, one may wonder how much they have contributed to the making of Arrow-Debreu as a trade-mark of rigorous economics.
during these decades -the paper became a benchmark of research no sooner than the mid 1970s.
Another indicator of the success of the article is its use in textbooks. The hypothesis that textbooks lag behind research, and take over results only after they have been established does not apply to Arrow and Debreu 1954 
III.
Given p, maximize p · y j subject to
Call X i the set of x i so defined and
Given any x i ∈ X i there is x i ∈ X i such that u i (x i ) > u i (x i )
Given p, maximize u i (x i ) subject to x i ∈ X i and p · x i ≤ p · ζ i + Max 0, j α ij p · y i α ij ≥ 0, i α ij = 1. z ≤ ζ and "z h < ζ h " implies "p h = 0"
Theorem I Under assumptions I to V II there is an equilibrium satisfying condition (0).
There is a y ∈ Y such that (a) ξ < y + ζ, ξ = i ξ i
IX.
There is a non-empty set D of h( / ∈ L) such that for any i, x i ∈ X i , h ∈ D, u i (x i ) increases with x hi
X.
There is a non-empty set P ⊂ L such that:
(a) for any i there is an h ∈ P such that ξ hi < ζ hi . If y ∈ Y , h ∈ P,
there is y ∈ Y such that for h = h y h ≥ y h . and for at least one h ∈ D, y h > y h .
Theorem II Under assumptions I to V , V I , V II to X there is an equilibrium satisfying condition (0).
